RECENT CASES
6o L. Ed., 861 (1916). This decision, the court in the present case holds, is binding on
every inferior court in the United States on matters of international extradition. The
holding of the court rather than the course of reasoning whereby the holding was
reached is regarded. This is a rather dubious attitude in light of the fact that the circumstantial situations of the two cases differ essentially.
In the Kelly case, the crime charged was not the receiving of money knowing it to
have been fraudulently obtained, but the receiving by Kelly of government money from
government officials knowing that they had obtained it from the government by fraud.
The decision merely held that it was a crime in Illinois to receive public money known
to have been fraudulently obtained by public officers. Reliance was placed upon 2o
Stat. 280 of the United States. That statute relates only to the obtaining of public
funds from governmental agents and does not cover the broader offense of receiving
private money knowing it to have been fraudulently obtained. It would seem that
this statute does not apply to the present case, and it is doubtful whether the Kelly
v. Griffin decision should be controlling here.
The matter has been brought before the United States Supreme Court on a writ of
certiorari and it is probable that, due to the extra-legal aspects of the case, the decision
of the Circuit Court of Appeals will be affirmed. This indication is strengthened by the
fact that the trend of the Court is to interpret treaties broadly, thus facilitating the
rendition of alleged offenders against the laws of friendly nations. See Grin v. Shline,
187 U.S. ISI, 184, 23 Sup. Ct. 98, 1o (1902).
Louis TERKEL

Workmen's Compensation-Basis of the Action-[Ilinois, Missouri].-Two recent
cases present the problem of whether proceedings under workmen's compensation
acts are ex contractu or ex delicto. In Keller v. Industrial Comunission et al., 350 Ill.
39o, 183 N.E. 237 (1932), the claimant instituted proceedings under Ill. Smith-Hurd
Rev. Stat. 1931, c. 48, §§ 138 et seq., for the deaths of her two sons from injuries arising
out of and in the course of their employment by their step-father. The defense was the
common-law disability of a wife to sue her husband in tort. In Hope v. BarntesHospital,
55 S.W. (2d) 319 (Mo. App. 1932), proceedings were instituted under Mo. Rev. Stat.
1929, §§ 3299 et seq., for the death of the claimant's husband from injuries sustained
in the course of his employment by a charitable institution. The defense was the exemption of an eleemosynary institution from tort liability, on the theory of a trust
whose fund may not be depleted by the payment of damages for the negligent acts of
the trustees. Held, in each case, that the action was ex contractu and the defense invalid.
The decision in the Hope case, indeed, was based on the statute, supra, § 3299,
making the remedy contractual and elective on the part of the employer (whose acceptance, however, is presumed, § 33oo, and was not negatived in the principal case).
But even in the absence of a statutory declaration, as in the Keller case, the same result should be reached, on principle and according to authority. As said by the Illinois
court, a tort action arises from the wrongful conduct, intentional or negligent, of the
defendant; while under the above statutes, the employer's fault is not in issue, and even
the employee's contributory negligence may not bar recovery. 350 Ill. 390 397, 183

N.E. 237, 24o. The statutory provisions are read into the labor contract by law; an ac-
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tion thereon, consequently, sounds in contract. Walsh v. Waldron & Sons, 112 Conn.
579, 153 Ad. 298 (931); Reutenik, Adm'r., v. Gibson Packing Co., 132 Wrash. 1o8, 231,
Pac. 773 (1924); 6 R.C.L. 855. The result of both cases is in accord with the majority
view in the United States. The Linseed King, 48 F. (2d) 311 (1929); Previslen v. Derby
&Ansonia Developing Co., i12 Conn. 129, 151 Atl. 518 (i93o);Lazdryv. Skinner, 344
Ill. 579, 176 N.E. 895 (93i); Moeser v. Shunk, 116 Kan. 247, 226 Pac. 784 (1924); Wood
v. Vroman, 215 Mich. 449, 184 N.W. 520 (1921); Narozniak v. Perdek, 162 Ad. 118
(N.J.L. 1932); Hoover v. Globe Indenmity Co., 202 N.C. 655, 163 S.E. 758 (1932). A

few courts have held that the action is, properly, neither ex contractu nor ex delicto.
Thus in Wisconsin, it is regarded as a new, statutory remedy, dependent for its existence on the relationship of employer and employee. Van Blatz Brewing Co. et al. v.
Gerardet al., 201 Wis. 474,23o N.W.
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(1930). In California, it is regarded as quasi

ex contracit, a compulsory liability attached by statute to the labor contract. Los
Angeles Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of Cal. et al.,
57 Cal. App. 352, 207 Pac. 416 (1922). All reach the same result; hence it is submitted
that the courts in the principal cases properly held that the defenses urged were not
legal bars to the actions.
LEO SEGALL

